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Abstract
In 1997, Japan’s banks were in crisis due to hundreds of billions of dollars of nonperforming real estate loans. In response, the government performed three rounds of
capital injections in 1998, 1999, and the early 2000s. The capital injection of 1999,
authorized by the Prompt Recapitalization Act, made as much as ¥25 trillion ($208 billion)
available to financial institutions that applied, regardless of their capitalization. By the end
of the injection window, 32 banks and trusts applied for and received ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6
billion) total in preferred shares and subordinated debts. The Act required banks to submit
and adhere to restructuring plans in order to receive capital, leading to a series of mergers
and acquisitions. However, differing accounting methodologies, evergreening, and double
gearing allowed for systemic undercapitalization even with injections intended to help
institutions meet reserve requirements.
Keywords: capital injection, double gearing, evergreening, Financial Reconstruction
Commission, Japan, Japanese Financial Crisis, jusen, non-performing loans, Resolution and
Collection Corporation, zombie lending

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection
programs.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 The Prompt Recapitalization Act is also referred to in Japanese financial crisis literature and government
documents as the Banking Recapitalization Act, Early Strengthening Act, and Financial Function Early
Strengthening Act, written as 金融早期健全化法 in Japanese.
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At a Glance
In 1997, the Japanese financial crisis
began with the ballooning of nonperforming loans in the financial system.
After a capital injection in spring 1998
believed to be ineffective and underallocated, the Japanese Diet passed the
Prompt Recapitalization Act on October
13th, 1998.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: restore both domestic and foreign confidence
in Japan’s financial system by disposing of nonperforming loans on the balance sheets of financial
institutions.
Announcement Date

August 5, 1998

Operational Date

October 16, 1998

The Act allocated ¥25 trillion ($208 Injection Start Date
March 31, 1999
billion) of capital to be injected into any
bank and some non-bank financial End of Application Window March 31, 2001
institutions that applied. The Financial
¥25 trillion ($208 billion)
Reconstruction
Commission
(FRC) Program Size
reviewed
each
application.
The Peak Utilization
¥8.6 trillion ($71.6
billion)
applications required that applicants
submit management improvement plans Eligibility
Any financial institution;
in addition to information on capital
some nonbank financial
institutions
requests.
These
management
improvement plans factored into the Participants
32 financial institutions
FRC’s prescribed underwriting terms for
Administrator
Resolution and Collection
the capital injection—taking place in the
Corporation of Japan
form
of
preferred
shares
and
Legal Authority
Passed through the
subordinated debt—purchased by the
Japanese Diet; executed
Resolution and Collection Corporation
by the Prime Minister’s
(RCC), a subsidiary of the Depository
Office and DICJ
Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ).
The DICJ funded RCC’s purchasing through a series of government-backed agency bond
issuances, with leeway to borrow from the Bank of Japan as needed. There was no explicitly
defined repurchase schedule.
Between March 1999 and March 2002, 32 banks applied for capital injections; no
applications were rejected. Overall, of the ¥25 trillion allocated, ¥8.6 trillion ($71.6 billion)
was used to purchase preferred shares and subordinated bonds. Applicant banks, trusts,
and regional banks received varying capital underwriting terms dependent on the
submission of management improvement plans. By mid-2015, all banks but one had
repurchased all shares and subordinated debt.
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Summary Evaluation
Experts view the 1999 capital injection as more successful than that of 1998. However,
there are differing views on whether the system remained undercapitalized following the
injection. While some scholars argue the system was fully capitalized, others note the
systemic underreporting of non-performing loans on balance sheets, propagated by
governmental intervention as well as the practices of zombie lending (extending capital to
non-performing firms to disguise non-performing loans) and double gearing (cyclical asset
purchasing to increase capital on balance sheets) prevented full capitalization of the
Japanese financial sector.
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Japan Context 1998–1997
GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)

$4.35 trillion in 1997
$4.52 trillion in 1998
$35,022 in 1997
$31,903 in 1998
Data for Q4 1997:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Data for Q4 1998:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aa1
S&P: AAA
$9.86 trillion in 1997
Size of banking system
$9.73 trillion in 1998
226.5% in 1997
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
215.1% in 1998
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
84.1% in 1997
system
79.2% in 1998
42.6% in 1997
5-bank concentration of banking system
43.6% in 1998
Data not available for
Foreign involvement in banking system
1997–1998
Data not available for
Government ownership of banking system
1997–1998
Yes in 1997
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes in 1998
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Overview

Background
The Japanese financial crisis began in November 1997, after the default of a midsized
securities firm, Sanyo Securities, leading to Japan’s first interbank loan default. Within
weeks, Hokkaido Tokushoku, a major bank in Japan, was forced to declare bankruptcy due
to inability to borrow in the interbank market, followed by the securities dealer Yamaichi
Securities. Within the month, Tokuyo City Bank also failed. By December 1997, the
government determined a necessity for public intervention in the financial market, but
simultaneously permitted a change in accounting methodology where banks’ real estate
assets regularly listed on balance sheets as historical acquisition prices rather than book
value, allowing banks to artificially inflate the value of the loans on their balance sheets
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). The decision led to an eventual loss of confidence in the
accounting and auditing system in Japan, as the true amount of bad loans at failed financial
institutions exceeded the amount published prior to the failure of these institutions (Fukao
2000).
While the Japanese financial system faced difficulties in the early 1990s, there was no
formalized capital injection framework, as Japan had never suffered a banking crisis in the
post-war era (Nakaso 2001). The Japanese Diet, the legislative body of Japan, passed its
first measure of intervention to counteract the banking crisis in February 1998 with the
Financial Function Stabilization Act. The act allocated ¥30 trillion of public funds to
support the banking sector, of which ¥13 trillion was specifically allocated for bank
recapitalization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
Experts viewed the capital injection of March 1998 as unsuccessful, with only ¥1.8 trillion
utilized out of the ¥13 trillion allocated, spread across 21 institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap
2010). Banks were reluctant to participate in the program, unwilling to be singled out as a
weaker bank. Ultimately, all major banks applied for capital injections simultaneously to
disguise any signaling of weakness (Nakaso 2001). The healthiest bank of the 21
institutions applied for only ¥100 billion in capital with only one bank applying for more.
As a result, few if any banks received enough funding to become well-capitalized (Hoshi
and Kashyap 2010). In addition, there was no thorough clean-up of bank balance sheets for
those banks seeking public capital injections (Fukao 2000). Banks originally shunned the
program, but government pressure finally resulted in each of the major banks applying for
the same amount of public funds. There were two possible reasons for banks refusing
public funds. First, banks may have feared applying for public funds in sending negative
signals about their respective balance sheets pushing down the value of existing equity.
Banks may also have feared the seniority of new securities purchased by the government to
existing security claims (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
Public dissatisfaction over the handling of the financial crisis mounted, leading to a show of
public distrust in the current Diet with the election of the Liberal Democratic Party to
majorities in both houses of the Diet as well as the Prime Ministership (Hoshi and Kashyap
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2010). In summer 1998, issues in the financial system proved persistent with the stock
price of Long-Term Credit Bank falling sharply after a rejected merger between itself and
Sumitomo Trust and Banking (Fukao 2000).
Many major Japanese banks still were under-capitalized following the execution of the
Financial Function Stabilization Act. In response, the plenary session of the Japanese Diet
began with the Liberal Democratic Party announcing a forthcoming package of bills aimed
to combat the unstable Japanese financial landscape. The Prime Minister’s Office on August
5, 1998, introduced a package of five financial stabilization bills to the Diet (Japan Times
1998a). On October 16, 1998, the Japanese Diet passed the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the
final form of the bank recapitalization bill (Japan Times 1998e). A timeline of legislation
passed during 1998 is in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Timeline of Legislation
February 16, 1998

Financial Function Strengthening Act

June 5, 1998

Financial Reconstruction Law

Mid-Early October 1998

Establishment of FRC
Revolving Credit Transfers Facilitation Act
Financial Services Agency Establishment Act
Amendment to Deposit Insurance Act
Measures regarding debt management collection
business

Mid-Late October 1998

Prompt Recapitalization Act

December 1998

FRC Inaugurated

Source: Nakaso 2001.

Program Description
The Prompt Recapitalization Act was intended to restore both domestic and foreign
confidence in Japan’s financial system by disposing of non-performing loans on the balance
sheets of financial institutions (Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998). The Act also increased
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the budget for capital injections into undercapitalized banks from ¥13 trillion under the
previous law to ¥25 trillion ($208 billion) (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 4
The recapitalization was overseen by the Financial Reconstruction Commission, created by
the Financial Reconstruction Commission Establishment Law to oversee operations under
the suite of new laws passed for financial stabilization in October 1998 (Nakaso 2001;
Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998). The FRC was an independent commission and arm to
the Prime Minister’s office called the Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC). The FRC
was independent of the Bank of Japan or the Treasury. Five members were appointed to
this committee, with the chairman appointed from the prime minister’s cabinet (Nakaso
2001). The FRC was required to terminate its job of special administration on March 31,
2001 (Iimura 1999).
The Financial Revitalization Act5, a sister act passed in the same month as the Prompt
Recapitalization Act, established the Resolution and Collection Committee (RCC)6, an asset
management corporation, as a subsidiary of the Depository Insurance Corporation of Japan
(DICJ) (DICJ 2021b). Funded by the DICJ, the RCC purchased either preferred stocks or
subordinated bonds from the financial institutions that applied for capital injections under
the new scheme (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010; DICJ n.d.a).
No banks were excluded from eligibility under the Prompt Recapitalization Act. Three nonbank financial institutions, all cooperatives, were also eligible, referred to by name in the
law: Norinchukin Bank; the Agricultural Cooperative Association; and the Federation of
Fisheries Cooperative Associations. There were also no barriers to foreign banks
participating, although these foreign banks were subject to more stringent capital adequacy
requirements in comparison to their domestic counterparts (Prompt Recapitalization Act
1998). Each organization faced separate capital adequacy ratio definitions dependent on
their status as bank holding companies, financial institutions, or financial institutions with
subsidiaries as well as their status as domestic or foreign institutions.
In addition to no exclusions from eligibility for this intervention, there were no explicit
capital limits written for participating banks.

In addition to the ¥25 trillion allocated for recapitalization, the government allocated an additional ¥18
trillion for the nationalization of failed banks under the Financial Revitalization Act (Fukao 2000, 4).
Combined with ¥17 trillion in depositor protection, this totaled to a ¥60 trillion package for financial
stabilization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010, 409).
5 The Financial Revitalization Act is also referred to as the Act for Rehabilitation for Financial Functions. It
was Act No. 132 during Heisei 10, or 1998, written as 金融機能の再生のための緊急措置に関する法律 in
Japanese.
6 For more information regarding the RCC and its operations, please refer to the “The Resolution and
Collection Corporation of Japan” authored by Mallory Dreyer (2021).
4
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Banks requesting capital funding applied through the newly formed FRC and had to
provide restructuring plans to demonstrate how they planned to improve performance.
These plans were made available to the public (Nakaso 2001). In addition to restructuring
personnel, banks were asked to reduce the number of foreign branches (Fukao 2000).
Banks with higher capital adequacy ratios that sought funding were required to absorb
failing banks through mergers and acquisitions (Japan Times 1998d).
These additional constraints partially determined the terms for preferred shares
purchased by the RCC through capital injection. After receiving the request for a capital
injection, the FRC would assess the performance of the bank, nature of the instrument for
injection, and the management improvement plan to determine the appropriate cost of
capital for each bank (Nakaso 2001). After these terms were decided by the FRC, the RCC
would purchase and ultimately manage the shares and subordinated debt using capital
from the DICJ Early Strengthening Account, a fund set up for injections under the Prompt
Recapitalization Act, also called Act for the Early Strengthening of Financial Functions (DICJ
2021b; n.d.a).
Outcomes
In the initial phase of capital injections, 15 of the 16 major banks in Japan participated,
requesting a total of ¥4.8 to ¥5.7 trillion (Naito 1999). After evaluation, the 15 banks were
rewarded more capital than requested, totaling ¥7.46 trillion based on assessed need
(Fukao 2000; Nakaso 2001).7 Over the next two years, an additional 17 institutions applied
for capital injections, bringing the total to ¥8.6 trillion: ¥7.32 trillion in preferred shares
and ¥1.32 trillion in subordinated bonds (DICJ n.d.a). The FRC did not turn down any
applications (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). This injection exceeded the capital injection of
1998, for which 21 institutions applied for a total of just ¥1.8 trillion.
Almost every bank repurchased their shares and debt sold to the DICJ under this program,
as shown in Figures 1 and 2 below. Shinsei Bank remains the exception; formerly the LongTerm Credit Bank nationalized under the Financial Reconstruction Act, Shinsei Bank
continues to list the Resolution and Collection Commission as a major shareholder. As of
March 31, 2020, the DICJ and RCC hold 18.1% of Shinsei bank’s common shares (Shinsei
Bank 2021).

For more information on the terms of lending and private capital fundraising information, please refer to
Tables 1 and 2 in (Fukao 2000).
7
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Figure 2: Timeline of preferred share repurchasing
Bank

Injection Date

Final Repurchase Date

* Shinsei Bank is the successor of the nationalized Long-Term Credit Bank, nationalized
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank

March 1999

July 2006

Fuji Bank

March 1999

July 2006

Industrial Bank of Japan

March 1999

August 2005

Sakura Bank

March 1999

October 2006

Sumitomo Bank

March 1999

September 2006

Sanwa Bank

March 1999

May 2006

Tokai Bank

March 1999

June 2006

Toyo Trust & Banking

March 1999

June 2006

Mitsubishi Trust & Banking

March 1999

January 2001

Daiwa Bank

March 1999

March 2009

Asahi Bank

March 1999

June 2015

Sumitomo Trust & Banking

March 1999

March 2013

Chuo Trust & Banking

March 1999

March 2013

Bank of Yokohama

March 1999

August 2004

Ashikaga Bank

September & November 1999

February 2006

Hokuriku Bank

September 1999

July 2009

Hokkaido Bank

March 2000

August 2009

Bank of the Ryukyus

September 1999

July 2010

Hiroshima-Sogo Bank

September 1999

December 2005

Kumamoto Family Bank

February 2000

May 2006

Shinsei Bank*

March 2000

—

Chiba Kogyo Bank

September 2000

July 2013

Yachiyo Bank

September 2000

March 2006

The Nippon Credit Bank

October 2000

June 2015

Kansai Sawayaka Bank

March 2001

October 2003

Higashi-Nippon Bank

March 2001

March 2011

Kinki Osaka Bank

April 2001

June 2015

Gifu Bank

April 2001

December 2010

Fukuoka City Bank

January 2002

July 2010

Wakayama Bank

January 2002

December 2005

Kyushu Bank

March 2002

February 2008
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under the Financial Reconstruction Act.
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020b.
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Figure 3: Timeline of subordinated debt repurchasing.
Bank

Injection Date

Final Repurchase Date

Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank

March 1999

March 2005

Fuji Bank

March 1999

September 2004

Industrial Bank of Japan

March 1999

March 2004

Sanwa Bank

March 1999

September 2005

Asahi Bank

March 1999

March 2009

Sumitomo Trust & Banking

March 1999

January 2004

Mitsui Trust & Banking

March 1999

March 2005

Bank of Yokohama

March 1999

May 2004

Kansai Sawayaka Bank

March 2001

January 2004

Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020b.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The Prompt Recapitalization Act was introduced in conjunction with other
financial revitalization legislation, though not explicitly part of a package.
The Japanese Diet passed a series of financial revitalization bills on October 2, 1998 (Japan
Times 1998c). Among these bills were the Financial Reconstruction Committee
Establishment Law, the Revolving Credit Transfers Facilitation Act, the Financial Services
Agency Establishment Act, an amendment to the Deposit Insurance Act, and measures
regarding debt management collection businesses. The evening of the passage of this set of
bills, the Liberal Democratic Party proposed a plan for bank recapitalization to be debated
by the upper and lower houses of the Japanese diet (Japan Times 1998b). The bill was
passed 14 days later on October 16, 1998 (Japan Times 1998e).
The legislation was part of a series of capital injections between 1998-2008, preceded by a
capital injection in March 1998, and followed by a third injection legislation in June 2004
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
2. The Prompt Recapitalization Act passed formally through the Japanese Diet.
The Japanese Diet first addressed the banking crisis in February 1998 with the Financial
Function Stabilization Act. This act allocated ¥30 trillion of public funds for a set of
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measures, including ¥13 trillion for bank recapitalization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
However, just ¥1.8 trillion of funds were allocated in March 1998 (DICJ 2020a).
The plenary session of the 1998-99 Japanese Diet began with the Liberal Democratic Party
announcing a forthcoming package of bills aimed at the unstable Japanese financial
landscape. Beginning as two financial stabilization bills introduced to the Diet by the Prime
Minister’s Office on August 5, 1998, the proposed stabilization program eventually evolved
into the Financial Reconstruction Act—which provided the framework with which to
nationalize the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan—in addition to an act establishing the
Financial Reconstruction Commission, both of which were passed through the lower house
on October 2, 1998 (Iimura 1999; Japan Times 1998a; Japan Times 1998b). That evening,
the Liberal Democratic Party proposed a bill for bank recapitalization (Iimura 1999). On
October 13, 1998, the Japanese Diet passed the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the final form
of the bank recapitalization bill (Japan Times 1998d).
Through the new bills, the government doubled available funds for financial revitalization
from ¥30 trillion to ¥60 trillion. Of this ¥60 trillion, ¥25 trillion was available for capital
injections (Nakaso 2001). These injections were done in installments as banks applied for
funding (DICJ 2021a). In addition, ¥18 trillion was allocated to nationalize failed banks and
¥17 trillion was allocated for depositor protection (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
3. The capital injection was overseen by the FRC, an independent commission
under the Prime Minister’s office, but the RCC, an asset management company,
purchased and managed preferred shares and subordinated debts.
Within two months of the passage of the Prompt Recapitalization Act, the Financial
Reconstruction Commission (FRC) began to work on determining the dividend policies for
the preferred shares to be bought for capital injections (Japan Times 1998f). The FRC was
an independent commission under the Prime Minister’s office. It had five members,
including a cabinet member who served as the chairman, and oversaw the Financial
Supervisory Agency. Through legislation, the Diet gave the FRC planning authority on
matters concerning the resolution of financial institution failures and financial crisis
management, as well as the authority to inspect and supervise financial institutions
(Nakaso 1999).
By legislation, the FRC’s term only lasted for two years and officially ended in January 2001
(Spindle and Dvorak 2000). At that time, the FRC and the Financial Supervisory Agency
were merged to create the Financial Services Agency (FSA), now Japan’s bank, insurance,
and securities regulator. The FSA then took on the responsibilities of the FRC, and screened
applications for the final three banks to apply for public injection through the Prompt
Recapitalization Act.
The Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) was created as a merger between the
Housing Loan Administration Corporation and the Resolution and Collection Bank on April
1, 1999, under the Financial Revitalization Act (RCC 2018; DICJ 2021b). The RCC was
funded entirely by the DICJ (RCC 2018).
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The RCC was a subsidiary of the DICJ (DICJ 2021b). The DICJ acts independently of the Bank
of Japan or the Treasury, though in close cooperation. Financial assistance from the DICJ is
funded through the issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds. In rare instances, the DICJ
may borrow money directly from the Bank of Japan (FSB 2016).
The RCC used DICJ capital to purchase preferred shares and subordinated debt of banks
that requested capital injections (DICJ 2005) . The RCC noted that it was able to exercise its
rights as a shareholder and investor, although available information doesn’t clarify to what
extent the RCC exercised those rights (RCC 2018). The preferred shares converted to
common shares after a grace period; if the FRC (or FSA after the merger of the two
organizations) was dissatisfied by progress in restructuring for a specific bank, it could
convert the shares to common shares and use its position as largest shareholder to put
pressure on management (Kanaya and Woo 2000). The FRC determined the terms of the
capital on a case-by-case basis (Nakaso 2001).
Enforcement in defining the underwriting terms of the preferred shares and subordinated
loans faced issues due to varying leadership styles over the year and a half of the execution
of the law. While the first chair of the FRC, Hakuo Yanagisawa, attempted to enforce strict
terms such as calling for major restructuring of banks in exchange for capital injections, he
was removed from the position in less than a year to be followed by “less-resolute”
chairmen due to attempts to balance coalitions built in the Diet by Prime Minister Obuchi.
The changes in leadership to the FRC caused volatility in the Japanese market, with
shareholders unsure of future underwriting terms. Under the new chair, Michio Ochi, the
restructuring slowed. Where Yanagisawa inserted requirements that banks meet Basel
capital standards, Ochi dropped such requirements; similarly, where Yanagisawa requested
banks merge, Ochi was reluctant to force mergers (Spindle and Dvorak 2000). Following a
scandal after recordings surfaced with Ochi inviting bankers to approach him for more
lenient standards, Ochi was followed by three other Chairmen over the one and a half years
of the FRC’s existence before the first chairman of the FRC, Hakuo Yanagisawa, was
reappointed.
4. The recapitalization bill and requirements for recapitalization were announced
publicly and debated thoroughly before the execution of the capital injection.
The bill, announced as part of a series of bills to address the jusen problem, was originally
introduced as an idea by the Liberal Democratic Party in the plenary session of the
Japanese Diet (Japan Times 1998a). After the passage of other financial revitalization bills,
the Prompt Recapitalization Act faced much negotiation before its passage 14 days later
(Japan Times 1998c). Components of the original proposal changed—for instance, the
initial proposal contained a constraint that banks with a capital adequacy ratio of 8% or
higher would only receive capital injections when there is an “imminent danger or
deflationary spiral” (Japan Times 1998a).
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5. There were no constraints on financial institutions for eligibility, though
domestic banks were subject to a lower capital adequacy ratio requirement.
Any domestic or foreign bank was eligible for a capital injection (Prompt Recapitalization
Act 1998). However, no foreign banks participated (DICJ 2020b).
The law did not require participation of any banks (Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998). The
law also permitted applications by three specific non-banks, all cooperatives: Norinchukin
Bank, Agricultural Cooperative Association, and the Federation of Fisheries Cooperative
Associations.
Banks considered “capitalized” were required to acquire or merge with a struggling bank in
order to receive capital injections (Japan Times 1998d). The definition of undercapitalization varied depending on whether the bank was a domestic or foreign entity, as
shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 below (Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998).
Figure 4. Capital Ratios for financial institutions, bank holding companies, and their
subsidiaries
Banks or credit unions Other
with overseas sales offices, Institutions
and Norinchukin Bank
Classification
capital status

of

Classification of
capitalized status

sound Capital adequacy ratio of 8%

financial

Capital adequacy ratio of 4%
or more according to
domestic standards

under- Capital adequacy ratio of 4% Capital adequacy ratio based
to 8%
on domestic standards of
2%-4%

Classification
indicating Capital adequacy ratio of 2% Capital adequacy ratio of
that there is a significant to 4%
1%- 2%
under-capitalized
situation
Classification
indicating Capital
adequacy
ratio Capital adequacy ratio of
that there is particularly related to international 0%- 1%
low capital
unified standards 0% to 2%
Source: Prompt Recapitalization Act 1998.

6. The underwriting terms of capital injections were dependent on both
capitalization status and management improvement plans.
In addition to balance sheet information, banks were required to submit management
improvement plans that explained structural changes they planned to make. These affected
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the underwriting terms for the preferred shares and subordinated bonds purchased in the
capital injections. The FRC sought to encourage restructuring, cost reduction, and
corporate reorganization, and including these factors in management improvement plans
decreased the overall cost of government capital through reduced dividends and bond
yields (Nakaso 2001). Capital was injected both through purchases of preferred shares and
subordinated debt (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). (A detailed table listing of the dividend
terms for preferred shares for the first 15 banks to receive injections is available in the
source note; a listing of underwriting terms for subordinated debt of the first 15 banks to
receive injections is available in the source note as well.)
Preferred shares had mandatory conversion dates to common shares; however, many
banks chose to purchase these preferred shares and reissue common shares before their
respective mandatory conversion dates (DICJ 2020b).
In addition, banks were encouraged to close foreign branches and subsidiaries, and
incorporated such stipulations into their restructuring plans. They were rewarded in
underwriting requirements guided by a rubric shown below in Figure 8. The proposed
restructuring plans also involved reductions of personnel (Fukao 2000). An example of
these proposed reductions are in Figures 5, 6, and 7 below:
Figure 5. Proposed closing of foreign branches
Bank

Type

Bank of Yokohama

Complete withdrawal by March 1999

Daiwa Bank

Complete withdrawal by March 2000

Mitsui Trust and Banking

Complete withdrawal by March 2000

Chuo Trust and Banking

Complete withdrawal by March 2000

Toyo Trust and Banking

Complete withdrawal by March 2001

Source: Fukao 2000.
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Figure 6: Proposed changes in number of foreign branches and subsidiaries
March
1998

March
2003

Change in Rate of
Number
Change
(%)

Industrial Bank of Japan

38

28

-10

-26

Dai-Ichi Kangyo

46

31

-15

-33

Sakura Bank

46

32

-14

-30

Fuji Bank

43

27

-16

-37

Sumitomo Bank

64

36

-28

-44

Sanwa Bank

45

33

-12

-27

Tokai Bank

46

21

-25

-54

Asahi Bank

21

6

-15

-71

Mitsubishi Trust and Banking

19

10

-9

-47

Sumitomo Trust and Banking

16

6

-10

-66

City banks:

Source: Fukao 2000.
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Figure 7: Proposed changes in personnel and related expenditures
**millions of yen, %

Bank
Industrial Bank of
Japan
Dai-Ichi
Bank

Fuji Bank
Sumitomo Bank
Daiwa Bank
Sanwa Bank
Tokai Bank
Asahi Bank

Other Costs

March
1999

March
2003

Rate of
Change

March
1999

March
2003

Rate of
Change

March
1999

March
2003

Rate of
Change

4776

4482

-6

68600

68000

-1

60700

49800

-18

16130

13200

-18

165600

138300

-17

166200

149300

-10

16700

13200

-21

179900

152100

-16

195300

185700

-5

14250

13000

-9

153000

137500

-10

137000
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156100
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-18
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-17
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89569

-2

13600
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-16

148400

125600

-15

144400

140900

-2
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9731

-13
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92700

-17

89705

82996

-8

12800
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-8

113700

107000

-6

94000

93000

-1

5718

4512

-21

50500

43000

-15

41700

40000

-4

4932

4695

-5

68293

62640

-8

60086

59828

0

5900

5200

-12

61000

52000

-15

56500

53600

-5

4100

3400

-17

42300

38100

-10

30700

30000

-2

9980

8900

-11

91600

82100

-10

78300

71600

-9

142651

122820

-14

1473593

129864
0

-12

1384169

1307693

-6

of

Mitsubishi Trust
and Banking
Sumitomo Trust
and Banking
Toyo Trust and
Banking
Mitsui Trust and
Banking + Chuo
Trust and Banking
Total

Personnel Costs

Kangyo

Sakura Bank

Bank
Yokohama

Number of Employees

Source: Fukao 2000.
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The management improvement plans were graded on a rubric, where points were allocated
for restructuring behaviors consistent with the FRC’s expectations to successfully eliminate
the non-performing loan problem. An approximate translation of the rubric is in Figure 9
below:
Figure 8: Rubric for management improvement plans
Evaluation items for improvement of management soundness plan
Gain Points
1. Response to reorganization
(1) Are you prepared for financial restructuring such as mergers, subsidiaries, and
capital alliances?
(2) Are alliances with other types of businesses conducted?
2. Business reconstruction
(1) Has the regional bank completely withdrawn overseas or has it reduced overseas
branches/local subsidiaries?
(2) Are there specific and clear strategies for improving profitability?
(3) Is the organization planning to fundamentally reform itself?
3. Restructuring
(1) Has the total labor cost been reduced?
(2) Has the number of officers and the number of employees been reduced ?
(3) Have property costs (excluding mechanization costs) been reduced?
4. Other
(1) Is the total amount of loans (excludes impact loans and actual basis) increased?
(2) Is self-procurement planned?
(3) Is the public fund application amount particularly sufficient?
(4) Is the internal corporate rating accurate?
(5) Is the liquidation of non-performing loans specifically planned?
(6) Is the usage of consultants and advisors abolished?
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(7) Has the average monthly salary decreased sufficiently (whether salary system has
been revised)?
(8) Are dividends reduced?
Lose Points
(1) Is processing of unrealized loss on securities slow?
(2) Is there a description of the background of the occurrence of bad debts?
(3) Is the number of officers changing or increasing?
(4) Is the payment of director bonuses, remuneration, and retirement bonuses
excessive?
(5) Is there an increase in property expenses?
(6) Is the disposal of idle facilities insufficient?
Source: Financial Reconstruction Commission 2001.

7. There were constraints on management pay as well as shareholder
compensation.
During the course of the capital injection, management positions were no longer allowed to
take bonuses on their salary. In addition, the banks were no longer allowed to issue
dividends to shareholders while using capital injection funding (Prompt Recapitalization
Act 1998).
8. There was no explicit exit strategy outlined or mandated for banks participating
in the capital injection.
All banks receiving capital injections in the form of subordinated debt received step-up
clauses that began after three years of receiving the injection. Mandatory conversion dates
of preferred shares for each bank varied widely, from within three months of injection in
the case of Daiwa Bank to after six years in the case of Sumitomo Bank (DICJ 2020b).
There were no explicit legislated or enforced exit strategies. However, all banks but one—
Shinsei Bank, formerly the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan—repurchased their shares by
June 2015 (DICJ 2020b). The Shinsei Bank continues to list the Resolution and Collection
Commission as a majority shareholder. As of March 31, 2020, the DICJ and RCC hold 18.1%
of Shinsei bank’s common shares (Shinsei Bank 2021). These shares resulted from a
negotiation between Ripplewood Holdings and the Japanese government, as a condition to
buy the Long-Term Credit Bank in 1999. While Ripplewood could not immediately offload
the bad loans, they were provided an injection through the capital injection scheme, in
addition to a guarantee that the Japanese government double the Long-Term Credit Bank’s
loan-loss reserves (Bremner 1999).
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III. Evaluation
Unlike the capital injection in March 1998, the Prompt Recapitalization Act provided more
capital to relieve stress due to non-performing loans. However, there is some disagreement
whether the capital injection was large enough to meet estimated potential losses in the
Japanese banking system. Nakaso argues that the banking system suffered from nearly
¥11.7 trillion potential losses due to non-performing loans in 1999. With the original ¥7.2
trillion of injected capital, in addition to the ¥2.1 trillion of private fundraising and the ¥2.5
trillion net operating profit, the capital injection was sufficient in capitalizing the banking
sector (Nakaso 2001). However, some economists and analysts believed that
underreporting of non-performing loans still occurred into 2002, after the capital injection.
By 2002, the amount of non-performing loans in the banking system actually increased
from the original ¥29.6 trillion in March 1999 to ¥42.0 trillion (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
Kashyap estimates that the combined effect of the banking problems was approximately
¥40 trillion, though estimated varied broadly as seen below in Figure 10 (Kashyap 2002).
Figure 9: Experts’ estimates of the insolvency of the Japanese banking system
Analyst

Firm

Estimate

Comments

David
Atkinson

Goldman Sachs
(October 31, 2001)

¥70 trillion of net loan
losses based on March
2001 loans (¥18.7 trillion
for the major banks)

Large bank losses represented
161% of capital adjusted for tax
loss carry forwards and public
money.

Robert
Feldman

Morgan Stanley
(August 2002)

¥22 trillion

Intended to be a lower bound for
additional taxpayer exposure.

James Fiorillo

ING Securities (Japan)
(August 2002)

¥19.9 trillion in net loan
losses, -¥2 trillion in
unrealized capital gains

Capital (as reported without
adjustments) ¥16.2 trillion.

Yukiko Ohara

Credit Suisse First
Boston Securities
(Japan) Limited (July
2002)

¥21.8 trillion in required
credit costs for the major
banks

Estimated non-performing loans
for the major banks: ¥121.9
trillion.

Paul Sheard

Lehman Brothers
(August 2002)

“To restore the balance
sheet health and
credibility of the banking
system would probably
require ¥30 to ¥50
trillion.”

Note that the deposit insurance
fund has ¥49 trillion of untapped
capacity. Thus, infrastructure and
budgeting are in place to act if
there was political will.

Reiko Toritani

Fitch Ratings (August
2002)

¥23 trillion for the major
banks

Adjusting the stated value of equity
for the major banks as of March
2002 to account for fictitious tax
credits, public funds, and
unrealized gains implies a market
value of essentially zero.

Source: Kashyap 2002.

273

Prompt Recapitalization Act

Unnava

Despite dispute over the appropriate size of the injections, it is widely believed that the
injection helped recapitalize the Japanese financial system. Nakashima and Souma (2011)
find the two injections of 1998 and 1999 significantly reduced financial risks faced by
banks through reduced default risks. The capital injection of 1999 succeeded in comparison
to the injections of 1998 due to the risk-based liability evaluations for capital injections in
the Prompt Recapitalization Act, where regulators had access to bank balance sheets, in
comparison to the Financial Function Stabilization Act, where the commission overseeing
injections were unable to look at bank balance sheets (Nakaso 2001; Allen, Chakraborty,
and Watanabe 2009). Banks receiving capital injections in 1999 increased lending, while
the 1998 capital injection had no such effects (Allen, Chakraborty, and Watanabe 2009).
In addition to the capital injections, banks merger activity accelerated. In January 1999,
Chuo Trust & Banking Co. and Mitsui Trust & Banking Co. merged, cutting costs through
lowering salaries in a new, unified pay scale. In the next year, 17 banks announced mergers
(Spindle and Dvorak 2000).
However, some constraints in the Japanese financial system interfered with the Japanese
government’s ability to fully recapitalize the financial sector while successfully combating
the full scale of the non-performing loan problem, leading to disputes over the true capital
needs of the financial system.
First, the implementation of adjusted Basel capital standards for banks lead to systemic
overstating of capitalization on bank balance sheets due to Japanese accounting practices.
Japanese banks engage in long-term relationships with the businesses they fund; as banks
acquired shares in these firms, unrealized gains due to increase in share prices were
“hidden” from bank balance sheets by Japanese accounting standards. During negotiations
determining capital standards with the Basel committee, Japanese regulators successfully
argued that unrealized gains from these keiretsu shares should be counted towards tier-II
capital standards. However, as share prices fell, actual rates of capitalization fell as well,
reducing the size of Japanese banks’ tier-II capital holdings (Ito and Sasaki 2002). In
addition, Japanese banks tend to reserve only against recognized bad loans. In the early
2000s, the banks only capitalized enough to cover between 40 to 60 percent of all bad
loans in the banking system (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004).
Additionally, the fear of falling below capital standards encouraged bank credit lending to
insolvent borrowers under the belief that non-performing loans would become performing
loans, or the government would bail them out (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008). While
banks may lend capital to temporarily insolvent firms, Japanese banks continued extending
credit to firms unlikely to repay the loans. The practice of keeping insolvent firms alive—
even when receipt of repayment is doubtful—is referred to as evergreening. Evergreening
was especially prevalent in the Japanese financial system. Bank loans actually increased in
underperforming sectors (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004).
Firms with lower rates of profit and poor rates of return in the market received more loans
on the whole. Evergreening continued despite the lack of profitability due to the
overvaluation of keiretsu loans; had these firms gone bankrupt, the overvaluation of capital
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on bank balance sheets would be revealed (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). Whenever
borrowers faced serious financial trouble, banks would extend loans to conceal the status
of borrowers’ underperforming loans (Fukuda and Nakamura 2011).
The Japanese government also contributed to this process. After 1998, the government
heavily encouraged banks to increase their lending to small and medium-sized firms,
providing subsidized credit to these firms. Evergreening kept firms alive which distorted
competition through subsidized credit to underperforming firms. By the early 2000s,
roughly 30% of publicly traded firms were on “life support,” though weighted by assets,
these firms only constituted 15% of all publicly traded firms (Caballero, Hoshi, and
Kashyap 2008). These firms—referred to as zombie firms—exhibited inefficient behavior,
impacting productivity performance in Japan as inefficient firms reduced sector growth
(Ahearne and Shinada 2005). These zombie firms created ongoing distortions in the
market with lower job creation and industry productivity (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap
2008).
Simultaneously, in an attempt to raise capital from the private sector, banks would raise
money from life insurance companies, in a style of cyclical asset purchasing to build capital
known as double gearing. Banks issued securities to be purchased by life insurance
corporations. In return, life insurance companies issued subordinated debt and notes
purchased by banks which counted towards capitalization ratios for banks while
simultaneously increasing the capital with which life insurers could purchase bank
issuances. With this transaction, banks and insurers appeared more capitalized on their
balance sheets than the real amount of capitalization (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). At the end
of March 2001, seven life insurers held ¥5.4 trillion of bank stocks, and ¥5.1 trillion of bank
subordinated debts. In exchange, banks held ¥1 trillion of insurers’ surplus notes and ¥1.7
of subordinated debt (Fukao 2003).
These transactions introduced systemic risk to the Japanese banking sector, with insurance
companies constituting at least two of many banks’ top five shareholders as of 2002 (BIS
2002). Any failures of these insurers will lead to direct losses by banks (Hoshi and Kashyap
2004). When Chiyoda Life failed in October of 2000, Tokai Bank lost ¥74 billion yen—more
than 10% of the size of Tokai Bank’s capital injection in March 1999 (Fukao 2003; DICJ
2020b).
While Japanese regulators prohibit this transaction between pairs of banks or pairs of
insurers, they allow the behavior between bank-insurer combinations (Hoshi and Kashyap
2004). However, during the early 2000s, this practice was actually encouraged by certain
regulators, with the head of the Financial Services Agency publicly stating that double
gearing is highly beneficial in increasing public confidence in financial institutions (Fukao
2003).
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